“To be is to be something or other.” The Specifically Aristotelian Meaning of a Sentence by G. E. L. Owen and its Relevance to Mill’s Discussion of Ambiguity

Abstract

This paper examines G. E. L. Owen’s assertion, “To be [for Aristotle] is to be something or other”, exploring its specifically Aristotelian meaning and its potential to resolve the ambiguity problem raised by J. S. Mill. Mill criticized the ancient metaphysicians for conflating the existential verb “to be” with the copula, arguing they lack shared meaning. This paper investigates whether Owen’s interpretation, when understood within its Aristotelian context and applied specifically to the philosophy of the Stagyrite, offers a more robust answer to Mill’s critique than competing readings—most notably those proposed by L. Brown and C. H. Kahn. The analysis involves a close reading of Owen’s texts and traces their reception within philosophical discourse, with special attention to the ongoing debate on ambiguity. The paper concludes that his dictum—when applied to Aristotle—does, in fact, provide a more compelling response to Mill’s critique than the alternative interpretations. If, in addition, Owen’s identification of Aristotle’s specifically metaphysical being with the concept classified by Bonitz as εἶναι c dativo praedicati is correct, this would strengthen the case further.