Truth from God's Point of View? On the Semantics of Theological Statements

Abstract

The texts under discussion here are concerned with establishing a form of antirealism as the appropriate semantics for the class of theological propositions. I argue that theology is largely neutral to various semantic approaches. By no means can antirealism occupy a preferred position; indeed, in some respects, it is less appropriate than realist approaches. This train of thought will be unfolded by means of four theses: (1) In a theistic context, the distinction between metaphysical realism and antirealism loses its meaning. (2) The core intuition of realism is that of the radical fallibility of human cognition. (3) The metaphysical theories of traditional philosophical theology can be read in an antirealist manner by reinterpreting the connectives and quantifiers. (4) It is possible for contemporary theology to avoid an uncritical or naive metaphysical realism without having to turn away from the mainstream of analytic philosophy for that reason.